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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, t 
Plaintiff-Respondent, : Case No. 880493-CA 
v. t 
JOHN LANCE HICKS, » Category No. 2 
Defendant-Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is from defendant's conviction on two 
counts of Unlawful Distribution for Value of a Controlled 
Substance in the Third Judicial District Court, Summit County. 
As the conviction is for felonies which are not first degree or 
capital, this Court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal pursuant 
to Utah Code Ann. S 78-2a-3(2)(f). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
For purposes of this brief, respondent relies on the 
following provisions: 
Utah Code Ann. S 78-2a-3(2)(f) (1987) (Supp. 
1988) 
Utah Code Ann. S 58-37-8(1)(a)(ii) (1986) 
(Supp. 1988) 
Utah Code Ann. S 72-2-303(1) (1978) (Supp. 
1988) 
Rule 52(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
(1988) 
STATEMENT OF ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
Whether the opportunity afforded to defendant to commit 
a criminal offense was presented so as to not constitute 
governmental entrapment. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On or about December 4, 1984, defendant was charged 
with four counts of Unlawful Distribution for Value of a 
Controlled Substance in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-
8(l)(a)(ii)f to wit: cocaine on three counts and marijuana on one 
count. The four violations occurred between September 5, 1984 
and October 11, 1984. Defendant Jake Larimoref aka Jacob Cramer 
Larimore, aka John Lance Hicks was subsequently arrested and had 
counsel make an initial appearance for him. Defendant then 
failed to appear for the preliminary hearing which was scheduled 
for January 29, 1985. Three and one-half years later, defendant 
was apprehended in Salt Lake City and held on the charges 
alleged. 
On April 12, 1988 at the preliminary hearing, counts I 
and II of the information filed against defendant were dismissed 
because the confidential informant, Charles Scott, used to make 
the controlled buys could not be found to testify (R. 22). Soon 
after the preliminary hearing, defendant made a motion to dismiss 
based upon the defense of entrapment pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
S 76-2-303. The motion and case were heard by the Honorable Pat 
Brian on May 20, and June 21, 1988. After hearing testimony and 
closing remarks, Judge Brian denied the motion to dismiss and 
found defendant guilty on two counts of Unlawful Possession of a 
Controlled Substance with Intent to Distribute (R. 89). 
Defendant's appeal followed on August 16, 1988, based 
upon Judge Brian's refusal to find entrapment in the case. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
During the entrapment hearing, facts regarding the 
circumstances relating to the drug buys resulting in defendant's 
arrest came to light and are of factual importance to this 
appeal. During Mid-August through October of 1984, Officer Lloyd 
Hansen was involved in an undercover narcotics investigation in 
Summit County (R. 97 at 155). During that investigation, Officer 
Hansen used a confidential informant, Charles Scott, to work with 
him in the Park City and Heber area to make contacts and 
introduce the officer to anyone who would provide illicit drugs 
(R. 97 at 81). 
Scott came into contact with defendant in the first 
week of September 1984 (R. 97 at 5), and defendant that day took 
Scott's number following a conversation regarding defendant 
supplying Scott with drugs (R. 97 at 14). Officer Hansen was 
subsequently told by Scott that he had come in contact with 
defendant who was dealing a lot of cocaine (R. 97 at 82). The 
officer then conducted a controlled buy of illicit drugs through 
Scott at the place defendant was residing on September 5th, 1984 
(R. 97 at 83). The charge from this purchase was later dropped 
because Scott couldn't be found to testify after the three-and-a-
half -year time lapse. 
Officer Hansen, who made the buys for which defendant 
was charged on September 24, and October 11, 1984, first met 
defendant on or about September 28, 1984 (R. 97 at 23, 30, 81). 
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At that time the sale of drugs to Officer Hansen was discussed 
and defendant said he could supply the drugs and would consider 
doing so (R. 97 at 30-33). A few days later when the officer 
next saw defendant, defendant sold drugs to the officer resulting 
in the charges for which he was found guilty (R. 97 at 156-159). 
Additional pertinent facts contained in the record will 
be set out in the individual arguments below. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
A reviewing court, under Rule 52(a) of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure made applicable to criminal appeals, should 
not disrupt the finding of the trial court unless the reviewing 
court is convinced a mistake has been made. The purpose behind 
this strict standard of reversal is based upon the presumption 
that the finder of fact is in the better position to observe 
witness demeanor during testimony and give appropriate weight to 
the facts brought to light at trial. 
Defendant has failed to establish that the trial court 
erred in determining that no entrapment existed in the procuring 
of evidence against defendant. Neither Scott nor the officer 
involved in procuring illicit drugs from defendant used methods 
which violate existing standards of the fair and honorable 
administration of justice. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THIS REVIEWING COURT SHOULD UPHOLD THE TRIAL 
COURT DETERMINATION OF THE ENTRAPMENT ISSUE 
PURSUANT TO RULE 52(a) OF THE UTAH RULES OF 
CIVIL PROCEDURE MADE APPLICABLE TO CRIMINAL 
CASES. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-303(1) (1978), defines the 
defense of entrapment: 
Entrapment occurs when a law enforcement 
officer or a person directed by or acting in 
co-operation with the officer induces the 
commission of an offense in order to obtain 
evidence of the commission for prosecution by 
methods creating a substantial risk that the 
offense would be committed by one not 
otherwise ready to commit it. Conduct merely 
affording a person an opportunity to commit 
an offense does not constitute entrapment. 
The legislature's enactment of § 76-2-303(1) reflects 
an adoption of the objective view of entrapment. State v. 
Taylor, 599 P.2d 496 (Utah 1979). The objective view of 
entrapment focuses on whether the governmental conduct in the 
matter comports with a fair and honorable administration of 
justice. Id., at 499-500; State v. Wright, 744 P.2d 315, 318 
(Utah App. 1987); State v. Wynia, 754 P.2d 667, 669 (Utah App. 
1988) cert, denied State v. Wynia, 765 P.2d 1278 (Utah 1988). 
It has long been recognized that to apprehend persons 
who engage in illegal business activities, such as dealing in 
narcotics, the police must use deceptive methods. Such methods 
are acceptable as being fair and honorable. In State v. 
Bridwell, 566 P.2d 1232, 1233 (Utah 1977), the Supreme Court, 
quoting the trial judge, stated: 
5-
I think it's very clear that, you know, 
it's not like a person who is dealing in 
narcotics goes out and solicits his wares, 
solicits purchases in the community like 
other merchants do; I mean, these are covert 
operations. And so the police and the 
sheriff use covert methods in order to 
attempt to bring these things to a halt. 
In State v. Kourbelasf 621 P.2d 1238, 1239 (Utah 1980), 
this concept was reiterated when the Court stated that "[i]t is 
well known that, due to the secretive nature of trafficking in 
drugs, it is common practice to use undercover agents to 
investigate such activity. Unless there is an abuse or 
imposition, that procedure is recognized as legitimate." 
(Citations omitted). 
Recognizing that undercover work is a legitimate means 
to use in investigating illegal operations, the determination of 
how far the undercover operations can go and not become 
entrapment is a question of fact for the trial court to 
determine. Rule 52(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
(1987), provides in part: "Findings of fact, whether based on 
oral or documentary evidence, shall not be set aside unless 
clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the 
opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the 
witnesses." The Supreme Court in State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 
192 (Utah 1987), expressly stated that Rule 52(a) applies in 
criminal cases. 
The question for this Court under Rule 52(a) "is not 
whether it would have made the findings the trial court did, but 
whether 'on the entire evidence [it] is left with the definite 
and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.'" State v 
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Ashe, 745 P.2d 1255, 1258, n. 5 (19 ), quoting Zenith Radio 
Corp, v. Hazeltine Research Inc., 345 U.S. 100, 123, 89 S.Ct. 
1565, 1576, 23 L.Ed. 2d 129 (1969). 
The entrapment defense raised by defendant in the 
instant case rests largely upon defendant's own testimony of the 
factual events leading to his arrest for drug distribution. As 
the record of the proceedings in the trial court shows, 
defendant's credibility was effectively questioned by his own 
admissions and his contradictory testimony. Defendant's 
admission that he would lie to get out of trouble exemplifies his 
lack of credibility (R. 97 at 51-53). At the entrapment hearing, 
defendant testified that Mr. Benatino was his sole source of 
cocaine. This testimony conflicts with previous admissions made 
by defendant to his arresting officer regarding his source of 
illicit drugs. At the time of arrest, defendant swore he was 
telling the arresting officer the truth when he gave various 
names of persons who supplied him with drugs (R. 97 at 50). 
Defendant also testified to using an alias, Jacob Larimore, to 
avoid being detected and caused to face the federal charges 
pending against him in Colorado (R. 97 at 43-44). 
Another apparent inconsistency in defendant's 
testimony, affecting his credibility, are his statements 
concerning contacts with Scott from the first of September to 
about September 25th, 1984. Defendant initially testified that 
Scott contacted him by phone as many as ten times up to September 
25th and that defendant responded to these contacts by saying he 
could not supply the drugs (R. 97 at 15-16). Only minutes later, 
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on direct examination, defendant testified that he first sold 
cocaine to Scott on September 16th of 1984, contradictory to his 
previous testimony that he told Scott, on each occasion through 
September, that he could not supply drugs (R. 97 at 84). 
Beyond the established facts raising questions as to 
defendant's credibility lies the substance of his testimony which 
also requires examination to determine credibility. Defendant 
testifies that he began supplying drugs by the gram in mid-
September, that by the end of the next month he had enough 
credibility with his supplier to procure cocaine on credit, and 
that he could procure as much as a few kilos at one time (R. 97 
at 57-58). He also increased a zero client base to the point of 
supplying almost everyone he knew with drugs (R. 97 at 59). The 
believability of such a fantastic story must be carefully 
considered. 
The credibility of defendant's other witnesses also 
needs evaluation. All of the defense witnesses who testified as 
to the circumstances were shown to have strong biases in the 
case. Daniel Christians and Jan Beeman were arrested for illicit 
drug sales as a result of the same undercover work of Scott and 
Officer Hansen which resulted in defendant's arrest. Both of 
these witnesses, along with Lewis Sadleir, were at the time of 
the arrests and during the hearing, good friends of the 
defendant. The final defense witness, Edward Dawson along with 
his wife, were arrested for selling drugs to Officer Hansen 
during the undercover operation. The couple also brought a 
federal suit for 2.5 million dollars against the officer in 1985 
which was summarily dismissed in the officer's favor. 
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Defendant and the witnesses called in his behalf should 
be closely scrutinized to determine the credibility and weight 
that should be given to their testimonies. Judge Brian was free 
to disbelieve representations made by defendant and the other 
defense witnesses in their testimony because of these credibility 
questions and biases which were brought to light. Evaluations as 
to witness credibility are effectively made by the trier of fact 
who can see the demeanor of witnesses. Because of the trial 
court's superior opportunity to observe the witnesses, this Court 
should defer to Judge Brian's determination of the issues 
involved in this case. 
POINT II 
THE FACTS BROUGHT TO LIGHT AT TRIAL FAIL TO 
ESTABLISH ANY BREACH OF FAIR AND HONORABLE 
JUSTICE BY THE GOVERNMENTAL AGENCIES INVOLVED 
IN THE ARREST OF DEFENDANT. 
In reviewing matters involving factual sufficiency of 
evidence questions, the Supreme Court has determined that the 
reviewing courts should review the evidence and all inferences 
which may be reasonably drawn from those facts in a light most 
favorable to the verdict. State v. Udell, 728 P.2d 131 (Utah 
1986). Such a standard of review should also be used in the case 
before this Court, although the facts in any light establish the 
inadequacy of defendant's entrapment claim. 
Defendant rests his defense primarily on language often 
cited in entrapment cases which was first used by the Utah 
Supreme Court in State v. Taylor, 599 P.2d 496 at 503; 
Extreme pleas of desperate illness or appeals 
based primarily on sympathy, pity, or close 
personal friendship, or offers of inordinate 
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sums of money, are examples, depending on an 
evaluation of the circumstances in each case, 
of what might constitute prohibited police 
conduct. In evaluating the course of conduct 
between the government representative and the 
defendant, the transactions leading up to the 
offense, the interaction between the agent 
and the defendant, and the response to the 
inducements of the agent, are all to be 
considered in judging what the effect of the 
governmental agent's conduct would be on a 
normal person. 
Defendant has not established in the present case the existence 
of any of the specific instances stated in Taylor as examples of 
what might amount to prohibited police conduct. As the court 
record shows, defendant knew Scott, to whom he first sold drugs, 
for at most a week prior to selling him drugs (R. 97 at 45-48). 
In finding entrapment in the Taylor case, the Court 
found that the agent who made the controlled buys from the 
defendant had an intimate personal relationship developed over a 
substantial period of time with the defendant. The Court also 
determined that the defendant procured the drugs for the agent 
solely because he believed her to be suffering from drug 
withdrawal and that he could help alleviate that suffering. The 
agent also had a financial interest in each arrest she aided the 
police with, because she was paid per arrest. She had a motive 
to get anyone she could to supply her with drugs to earn money 
for being an informant. 
In the instant case, defendant, by his own admission, 
initially sold drugs to the police agent because of the 
opportunity to make money, and not because of any close 
relationship with the agent whom he had met only days earlier (R. 
97 at 25). Defendant, subsequent to the initial sale to Scott, 
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suggests that he supplied Scott with drugs because Scott would 
have to get the drugs somewhere. Defendant claims to have had 
humanitarian motivates in continuing to supply Scott with drugs, 
because he could control how much Scott consumed by selling the 
drugs to him. Such alleged motives for supplying drugs to Scott 
are interesting but not persuasive. They have little to do with 
the reasons given by defendant for supplying drugs to Scott—to 
make a profit (R. 97 at 25, 49-50). 
Under the Taylor language used by defendant, the only 
other claim would be the offering of "inordinate" amounts of 
money. Defendant testifies that his share in his initial 
admitted sale to Scott was to amount to about $350 but he 
received only $150 (R. 97 at 25). Either amount is rarely 
considered an inordinate sum of money, especially in the drug 
business. Defendant may base his argument on the assumption that 
a lot of money can be made on drug sales, but this inducement 
comes from the illicit drug market and not from Scott. Having 
established that the specifics enumerated in Taylor are not 
present in the instant case, the focus of the argument turns to 
the circumstances as a the whole. 
In State v. Wynia, 754 P.2d 667 (Ut. App. 1988), cert. 
denied State v. Wynia, 765 P.2d 1278 (Utah 1988), the undercover 
officer initiated the conversation regarding drugs with the 
defendant and this Court determined that that fact did not 
constitute entrapment. The Court continued on to reiterate the 
Supreme Court's position of condemning personalized high pressure 
tactics. Id, at 670. 
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State v, Spraque, 680 P.2d 404 (Utah 1984), and State v 
Kourbelasf 621 P.2d 1238 (Utah 1980), to allow a finding of 
entrapment. These cases differ from the instant case, however. 
Both Sprague and Kourbelas involved undercover agents who 
pursued, at great lengths for a long period of time, specific 
persons. Such persistent pursuit was not a fair and honorable 
administration of justice. These defendants were pursued to the 
point of being cornered into drugs sales when they were not ready 
and willing to commit the offense. 
In the instant case, Scott knew defendant only a week 
or less when defendant sold him drugs, a much shorter time than 
was involved in Spraque or Kourbelas. On the first occasion that 
the defendant met Scott, they had a conversation concerning the 
possibility of defendant supplying Scott with drugs, and 
defendant took Scott's name and phone number (R. 97 at 13-14). 
The number of times Scott gave the defendant the opportunity to 
supply him with drugs is a matter unresolved even in defendant's 
testimony and of little importance considering the length of time 
Scott knew defendant before an illicit drug relationship evolved. 
The testimony of the officer involved established that 
the first sale of drugs to Scott by defendant occurred on 
September 5, 1984. At this time, the officer conducted a 
controlled buy using Scott (R. 97 at 82-83). Defendant testified 
that he first met Scott in the first week of September (R. 97 at 
5). From the testimony, defendant started supplying drugs to 
Scott the first week and possibly the first day he knew Scott 
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The circumstances and Scott's conduct do not approach 
the persistent pursuit present in other cases in which entrapment 
has been found. Although the controlled buy does not constitute 
one of the buys used to charge defendant, it is important to 
establish the fact Scott merely afforded defendant, who was ready 
and willing to commit an offense, with the opportunity to do so. 
Scott's actions were within the limits constituting the fair and 
honorable administration of justice. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-303(1) states that conduct merely 
affording a person an opportunity to commit an offense does not 
constitute entrapment. In State v. Crippsf 692 P.2d 747 (Utah 
1984), the Supreme Court determined that the objective test 
language used in Taylor expressing that inducement to commit an 
offense constitutes entrapment when an "average person" would be 
persuaded to commit the illegal act can be viewed conversely. 
"Converse of the conduct which would 'persuade the average 
person' is conduct which would induce only a person engaged in a 
habitual course of unlawful conduct for gain or profit" to commit 
the unlawful act. Police conduct that "entraps" only those 
"ready and willing to commit the crime" is acceptable and does 
not constitute unfair governmental conduct. Id., at 750. 
Defendant in his testimony at trial states he always 
had a source of illicit drugs (R. 97 at 56). He also had a good 
working relationship with his source because, according to 
defendant's testimony and Officer Hansen's testimony, defendant 
went from supplying no cocaine to being able to supply upwards of 
two pounds of cocaine in a matter of less than two months (R. 97 
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at 56). Defendant also built an extensive clientele quite 
rapidly as he states in his testimony, "I sold to just about 
everyone I knew in Park City" (R. 97 at 59). Such a statement 
shows that defendant did not sell drugs only because of a close 
personal relationship with Scott; defendant was ready and willing 
to commit an offense that Scott merely afforded him the 
opportunity to commit. 
POINT III 
THE OFFICER MAKING THE DRUG PURCHASES THAT 
RESULTED IN THE ARREST OF DEFENDANT, ACTED TO 
ADMINISTER JUSTICE FAIRLY AND HONORABLY. 
Officer Hansen, in making the buys for which defendant 
was convicted, did not know the defendant until he conducted the 
controlled buy through Scott on September 5, 1984. Up until that 
time the officer did not know defendant existed and gave no 
instructions to Scott regarding his conduct toward the defendant. 
Scott's purpose was to introduce the officer to anyone who was 
supplying drugs in the Park City area. 
In State v. Udell, 728 P.2d at 133, an informant worked 
with officers expressly to introduce them to persons involved in 
illicit drugs. The informant in that case introduced the officer 
to the defendant at which time the defendant declined to sell the 
officer drugs, but later did agree to sell. In the instant case, 
according to the defendant's own testimony, defendant agreed when 
he first met the officer to consider selling drugs to him, and in 
fact sold drugs to the officer a few days later, the very next 
time the two saw each other (R. 97 at 32-36). 
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Defendant does not contend that Officer Hansen's 
conduct constituted entrapment and for good reason. Defendant 
was already heavily involved in selling drugs to almost everyone 
he knew in Park City before he was introduced to Officer Hansen. 
Officer Hansen involved himself with the defendant only after 
Scott informed him that defendant was involved in supplying a lot 
of cocaine. The conduct of the officer who made the buys for 
which defendant was convicted does not constitute entrapment. 
CONCLUSION 
Scott and the officer involved in the defendant's 
arrest and conviction of Unlawful Distribution for Value of a 
Controlled Substancer acted to afford the defendant with an 
opportunity to commit an offense which he was ready and willing 
to commit. Such conduct is within the just and honorable 
administration of justice constituting proper police conduct. 
Based upon the foregoing, the State requests this Court to affirm 
the lower court's finding of no entrapment and affirm defendant's 
conviction. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this Q day of February, 
1989. 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
Attorney General 
CHARLENE BARLOW 
Assistant Attorney General 
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